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Abstract 
The recent ‘religious turn’ within Locke scholarship has stressed the need to 
understand his theological commitments when approaching his political thought. One 
area of interpretation that has been completely transformed by this heightened 
sensitivity to the religious roots of Locke’s thought is his account of property 
ownership which, it is claimed, contains a ‘right to charity’—a subsistence 
entitlement that trumps established ownership rights. However, this increasingly 
accepted interpretive claim has been made without significant attention to the way in 
which charity is deployed throughout Locke’s writing. The aim of this article is to try 
and get to grips with Locke’s various usages of the term and determine whether the 
concept he deploys is a consistent one. After discussion of the uncertain role charity 
plays in his account of property, we examine how it is defined in the Essay 
Concerning Human Understanding, and then turn to the crucial position it occupies in 
his theological corpus. Though Locke’s understanding of charity seems fraught with 
ambiguities, the reason for these ambiguities relate to his configuration of charity as a 
disposition rather than a mere act, a configuration linked inextricably to his account of 
toleration. 
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I 
There has been a widely acknowledged ‘religious turn’ in recent interpretive accounts 
of Locke’s political thought.
2
 An appreciation of the deep theological underpinnings 
of his moral and political works—initially emphasised in the seminal work of John 
Dunn
3
—has become increasingly regarded as necessary to their understanding. The 
importance of this appreciation has been underlined more recently in Jeremy 
Waldron’s innovative and provocative analysis of the way in which Locke’s religious 
commitments substantively inform his egalitarian philosophical premises and 
normative prescriptions.
4
 The work of Dunn, Waldron and others has revealed 
numerous problems with previously dominant Straussian and Marxist readings of 
Locke’s political thought; readings that either ignored or explained away the 
significance of his theological commitments. What the ‘religious turn’ has revealed, 
above all, are the problems with regarding Locke as the philosophical father of liberal 
politics, a view that sits uncomfortably with much of his thought. 
 One area of interpretation that has been completely transformed by this 
heightened sensitivity to the religious roots of Locke’s thought is his well-known and 
still influential account of property ownership put forward in the Two Treatises. 
Long-established interpretations—often Marxist in origin—that viewed Locke’s 
theory as an ideological justification for ‘unlimited capitalist appropriation’, the 
personification of ‘possessive individualism’, have been thoroughly discredited, 
replaced by alternative readings that stress the conditions he attaches to property 
ownership; conditions with a markedly religious character.
5
 In fact, it has become 
increasingly accepted that one of the most crucial conditions that Locke places on 
ownership is a universal and unconditional entitlement to subsistence provisions, a 
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right that actually trumps established rights of justly owned private property and that 
derives from his Christian theology.  
The nature of this entitlement is, however, rather ambiguous, not only because 
it does not actually appear in the account of property in chapter V of the Second 
Treatise, but also because when it is invoked, it is described as a ‘right to charity’. 
Within contemporary liberal accounts of political morality, charity is customarily 
regarded as a voluntary transfer from one agent in a position of relative comfort to 
another in a position of relative indigence.
6
 Charity is certainly a moral obligation, 
but, crucially, it is an imperfect obligation, a supererogatory action that individuals 
can legitimately opt out of without suffering any significant opprobrium. Acts of 
charity are, by their very nature, legitimately avoidable. When such acts do take place, 
they are in recognition of imperfect duties, distinguishable from perfect duties; in 
liberal accounts of political morality, matters of charity are defined by what they are 
not, matters of justice.  
A. John Simmons rightly points out that Locke’s works are ‘liberally 
peppered’ with references to charity and that any denial of this can be dismissed as 
‘odd’.
7
 Yet Simmons and other recent Locke scholars deny that it is liberally 
peppered; that is to say, they reject the claim that the understanding of charity that 
Locke deploys is the liberal one of supererogatory moral action but rather a quite 
different Thomistic understanding. However, this now widely accepted interpretive 
claim about the Thomistic nature of Lockean charity has been made without sufficient 
attention to the way in which charity is deployed throughout his writing. Thus, the 
aim of this article is to try and get to grips with Locke’s various usages of charity and 
determine whether the concept that he deploys is a consistent one and then, on this 
basis, address its moral and political meaning.
8
 We begin by identifying the 
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ambiguous role occupied by charity in Locke’s account of property ownership and 
subsistence rights in the Two Treatises and in other relevant writings on politics and 
economics. After discussion of this, we move on to examine how Locke defines 
charity in the Essay Concerning Human Understanding, before turning to the crucial 
position it occupies in his theological corpus. We argue that whilst Locke’s 
understanding of charity and its relationship with justice in his political work seems 
ultimately fraught with ambiguities, proper attention to the breadth of his corpus 
reveals these ambiguities to be related to his acceptance and configuration of charity 
as a disposition rather than a mere act; a configuration that is inextricably linked to 
his account of toleration. 
 
II 
Locke’s account of property ownership begins with an original community of goods: 
he claims that, initially, God bequeathed the world ‘to Mankind in common’ and 
granted no individual an exclusive right of ownership.
9
 The way that private property 
rights emerge from this community of goods is through individual applications of 
labour on natural resources.
10
 The reason that labour is capable of generating such 
exclusive rights relates to a fundamental moral principle underpinning Locke’s 
thought, the duty to ensure their own preservation that individuals owe to God: ‘every 
one…is bound to preserve himself, and not to quit his Station wilfully’.
11
 It is this 
crucial moral obligation of self-preservation that gives the activity of labour real 
moral force.
12
  ‘It cannot be supposed’, Locke explains, that God intended the world 
to ‘remain common and uncultivated’, since it was given for human ‘benefit’.
13
 
Therefore, he suggests that when God ‘gave the World in common to all Mankind, 
[he] commanded Man…to labour, and the penury of his Condition required it of 
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him’.
14
 Importantly, Locke does not expect every individual to obey God’s 
‘command’ to labour, despite the fact that he thinks that they, morally speaking, 
should obey it.  Indeed, he draws an explicit distinction between the ‘Industrial and 
Rational’ who do obey the labour command and the ‘Quarrelsome and Contentious’ 
who do not and whose subsequently fraudulent claims to the property of others 
represent mere ‘Fancy and Covetousness’.
15
  This differential tendency to labour is 
further reflected in Locke’s view of how distributive shares ought to unfold: ‘different 
degrees of Industry’, he suggests, are ‘apt to give Men Possessions in different 
Proportions’.
16
  
  Locke is clear that when individuals acquire private property rights through 
labour, these rights ‘exclude…the common rights of others’.
17
 But what happens to 
those who simply fail to labour and, as a result, fall into a state of hopeless indigence 
whilst the world’s property is appropriated? In libertarian accounts of private property 
rights, such as that advanced by Robert Nozick, the story would seem to end here.
18
 
According to such theories, individuals are not thought to have an inviolable ‘right to 
life’ that would require a transfer of resources from a property-owner to a person 
under threat of starvation. This, however, is where Locke and libertarianism would 
seem obviously to part company, since he clearly is committed to human 
preservation; that is, after all, what provides labour (and therefore property rights) 
with moral justification in the first place.  
  It is then unsurprising that Locke does actually suggest that when an 
individual’s survival is not itself in question, that agent ought to do ‘as much as he 
can’ to ‘preserve the rest of Mankind’.
19
 This clearly has the potential to transform 
Locke’s theory of property, since it appears to show that individuals have positive 
obligations to others in addition to their direct duty to God, to secure their own 
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preservation through labour. There are, however, very few points in the Second 
Treatise at which Locke elaborates on this moral imperative to assist others. Even in 
the passage in which the imperative appears, our obligations to others are presented in 
a negative sense: thus, individuals 
…may not unless it be to do Justice on an Offender, take away, or 
impair the life, or what tends to the Preservation of the Life, the 
Liberty, Health, Limb or Goods of another.
20
 
 
This passage suggests that agents are obliged to refrain from threatening the life of 
another, rather than having any positive duty to preserve that life. The idea that 
individuals have substantial duties to others is repeated (or at least implied) elsewhere 
in the Second Treatise. On no less than three separate occasions, a ‘Fundamental Law 
of Nature and Government’ is identified as one that ensures that ‘as much as may be, 
all…Members of…Society are to be preserved’.
21
 Yet the precise meaning of this 
aspect of the law of nature and its corresponding impact on property ownership 
remains unclear. It is certainly insufficient evidence on which to ground a robust 
subsistence claim that would trump established property ownership—especially with 
the ambiguous ‘as much as may be’ clause. 
  There are other points within the Second Treatise where Locke appears to 
detail a subsistence right, but none are unambiguous. One notable example concerns 
children whom, he claims, have a ‘Title to their Father’s Estate for their 
Subsistence’
22
—a title that should be respected even when their father has been 
defeated in a just war.  In fact, in the First Treatise, Locke suggests that children are 
entitled ‘not only to a bare Subsistence but to the conveniences and comforts of 
Life’.
23
  However, despite the inviolable nature of this right, a very specific 
justification is offered for its existence, one that undermines any inference made from 
it to a wider concern with subsistence. ‘Children’, he explains, are entitled to a 
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subsistence right because ‘being by the course of Nature, born weak, [they are] unable 
to provide for themselves’.
24
  The implication seems to be that were children able – 
or, were children ‘adults’ – there would be no justification for subsistence provisions.  
This example does not, then, vindicate the case that Locke guarantees subsistence for 
the needy, because it is not that they are needy, but that they are children that is of 
moral relevance.
25
 
There is, then, no conclusive evidence of a substantial subsistence right 
anywhere in the Second Treatise.  But, as a number of commentators have pointed 
out, there is a passage in the First Treatise (I: 42), which does appear to reveal such a 
right.  Here Locke declares that: 
…we know that God hath not left one Man so to the Mercy of another, 
that he may starve him if he please: God the Lord and Father of all, has 
given no one of his Children such a Property, in his peculiar Portion of 
the things of this World, but that he has given his needy Brother a right 
to the Surplusage of his Goods; so that it cannot justly be denyed him, 
when his pressing Wants call for it.  And therefore no Man could ever 
have a just Power over the Life of another, by Right of property in Land 
or Possessions; since ’twould always be a Sin in any Man of Estate, to 
let his Brother perish for want of affording him Relief out of his Plenty.  
As Justice gives every Man a Title to the product of his honest Industry, 
and the fair acquisitions of his Ancestors descended to him; so Charity 
gives every Man a Title to so much out of another’s Plenty, as will keep 
him from extream want, where he has no means to subsist otherwise.
26
 
 
This is evidently an extremely important passage.  Locke here seems to suggest that in 
any individual in desperate physical need has a right to the goods of any property 
owner, provided the owner has a surplus of those goods. A property owner cannot 
justly deny the appropriation of such a surplus of goods by a needy individual and this 
would seem to legitimate actions otherwise classifiable as theft. If passage I: 42 is 
taken seriously, Locke’s claim seems to be that although some individuals are able to 
acquire rights to ‘justice’ through ‘honest Industry’ or inheritance, individuals always 
retain an equal and universal right to ‘charity’, a ‘Title’ to the surplus goods of 
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another in circumstances of desperate need. But this passage is not only anomalous in 
the context of the Two Treatises, it is also itself fairly ambiguous. The distinction 
between ‘justice’ (the acquisition of property through either labour or inheritance) and 
‘charity’ (the subsistence right) looks strange to the modern eye. This is because, as 
noted earlier, in modern liberal thought, charitable actions are supererogatory and 
therefore legitimately avoidable. How, then, can Locke defend a subsistence right that 
cannot ‘justly’ be denied whilst deploying the term ‘charity’ instead of ‘justice’ to 
classify this right?  
 
III 
Numerous Locke scholars would probably dismiss such a worry as essentially 
anachronistic: they would regard it as fundamentally mistaken to interpret Locke’s 
deployment of the term ‘charity’ through the conceptual distinctions associated with 
contemporary liberal accounts of political morality. This is because the modern liberal 
conception of charity as supererogatory action was not given systematic expression 
until the eighteenth century by thinkers such as Adam Smith and the imputation of 
such an understanding to Locke is to make a basic historical error. Whilst considering 
the provision of alms to the needy, Smith contended that ‘a beggar is an object of our 
charity and may be said to have a right to demand it—but when we use the word right 
in this way it is not in a proper but a metaphoricall sense’.
27
 In other words, the 
beggar has a right to our alms, but because it is only an imperfect right, there exists 
only an imperfect obligation and we can legitimately withhold assistance.  
  Most recent analysts of this area of Locke’s thought seem to implicitly endorse 
such a charge of anachronism insofar as they assume I: 42 to reveal his brief rehearsal 
and approval of a medieval and early modern understanding of charity. James Tully, 
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for example, views this passage as evidence of Locke’s incorporation of a Thomistic 
understanding of charity in an attempt to respond to apparent defects in the natural 
law accounts of property advanced by Grotius and Pufendorf.  Unlike Grotius who did 
not incorporate such a duty and unlike Pufendorf who embedded it in the wider 
context of property rights based on convention, a charitable obligation for Locke is 
described by Tully as a ‘natural and positive duty’ enshrined in natural law.
28
  Tully’s 
claim is that Locke’s suggestion in this passage is that ‘where no means are available 
for a man to provide for himself, the right to the means of subsistence applies directly 
to another person’s goods….A proprietor who has more than enough to sustain 
himself is under a positive duty to sustain those who do not’. Thus, ‘charity is a right 
on the part of the needy and a duty on the part of the wealthy’.
29
 Tully’s claim is that 
the roots of this idea of charity are markedly Thomistic.
30
  Aquinas’ understanding of 
charity, which Tully regards as ‘strikingly similar’ to that of Locke is expressed in the 
Summa theologiae:  
Things pertaining to human right cannot take anything away from 
natural right or Divine right.  Now according to the natural order 
established by Divine providence, lower things are ordained for the 
purpose of supplying man’s necessities.  And so the division and 
appropriation of such things which proceeds from human law does not 
cancel out the fact that man’s necessities must be supplied by means of 
those things.  And so whatever anyone has in superabundance is due 
under the natural law to the poor for their succour.
31
 
 
The point made here by Aquinas, that property rights over a ‘superabundance’ of 
goods do not hold when others are in desperate need, certainly does seem to mirror 
the view expressed by Locke in the First Treatise.  
  Other prominent scholars share Tully’s characterisation of Locke’s conception 
of charity as fundamentally distinct from the modern liberal alternative. In The 
Lockean Theory of Rights, A. John Simmons claims that it ‘seems to approximate the 
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familiar Thomistic conception’ identified by Tully.
32
  Yet Simmons does identify the 
obvious difficulty that such a reading invites for Locke’s account of property rights.  
For if the needy have rights of charity that permit them to appropriate the surplus 
goods of others, what does this mean for Locke’s idea of justice as property 
ownership through ‘honest industry’? Does one right (charity) actually trump the 
other (justice)? Though Simmons concludes that, in Locke’s writing, the relationship 
between justice and charity is ‘not very clear’
33
, he nevertheless regards the meaning 
of charity in Locke’s thought as fundamentally distinct from the modern, liberal 
signification. More recently, in God, Locke, and Equality, Jeremy Waldron – whose 
disagreements with Tully on Lockean matters are considerable – advances a similar 
view. He describes Locke’s idea of charity as ‘a quite general doctrine’, one 
expressed in language that is ‘emphatically stronger than the liberal tradition’ on the 
issue
34
 and identifies it as a ‘doctrine of rights generated by need’, which he suggests, 
‘is set out as explicitly and as generally as could be’.
35
  Charity is here again 
understood as an obligation that is unavoidable; it is not a supererogatory action but 
one that individuals can actually be bound to by political authority. Indeed, Waldron 
insists that ‘the fact that charity is regarded as a specifically Christian virtue is for 
Locke no reason for thinking that it is unenforceable’ by government.
36
  According to 
him, at the very least, I: 42 defends ‘the view that neither the rich nor civil society on 
their behalf is entitled to resist the poor when the poor attempt to seize their surplus 
goods for themselves’.
37
  
  Nevertheless, there is some evidence within Locke’s political thought that 
suggests his idea of charity is not as alien to that of modern liberalism as these 
commentators have claimed. As Waldron notes, within liberal political thought, 
charity is ‘a paradigm of a moral duty that ought not to be enforced’.
38
  Indeed, the 
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failure of an individual to comply with a duty of charity is perfectly legitimate and 
would epitomise what Waldron has elsewhere identified as the ‘right to do wrong’ 
that defines modern liberalism; a right that can be witnessed in a variety of activities 
ranging from campaigning for a political candidate one knows to be racist to the 
refusal to tell someone the time at a bus stop.
39
 Within most liberal accounts of 
political morality, the refusal of charity is such a wrong that we have a right to and 
therefore an affluent individual has the right to tear to pieces all the money in her 
wallet rather than give it to a hungry beggar.  According to Tully, Simmons, Waldron 
and others, Locke stands apart from modern liberalism in this regard. Indeed, for 
them, the entailment of Locke’s argument is that it is the beggar (provided she is 
hungry enough) that holds a property right over the money, not the agent whose 
wallet it happens to be in at the time. As already noted, scholars like Tully maintain 
that Locke’s idea of charity is Thomistic and non-modern, which implies that any 
attempts to examine him along liberal lines are doomed to collapse into anachronism. 
  Despite this, there is evidence that seems to indicate that under Lockean 
justice some uncharitable actions might be politically permitted without being morally 
endorsed. In other words, despite Locke’s insistence that the obligations of the law of 
nature are the measure of personal as much as political morality
40
, there is evidence to 
suggest that he does recognise a ‘right to do wrong’. One version of this right can be 
found in the Second Treatise itself.  As discussed above, although individuals have a 
divine ‘command’ to labour because the activity satisfies the fundamental duty of 
human preservation, Locke expects there to be a number of ‘Quarrelsome and 
Contentious’ individuals who will shirk this duty. Individuals clearly have a legal 
right to be lazy even though Locke views laziness as morally wrong. The lazy 
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certainly cannot claim title to the fruits of the labour of others, but their laziness will 
not be punished (unless, of course, they become a social nuisance). 
  There are other examples throughout his political works that would appear to 
lend credence to this interpretation. In his 1667 Essay on Toleration, in a discussion 
of the issue of begging, Locke identifies acts of charity as the recognition of duties 
that should (morally) be observed, but need not be (juridically) imposed. In fact, he 
goes much further than to merely define the failure to engage in charitable acts as a 
‘right to do wrong’: 
Even charity itself, which is certainly the great duty both of a man and a 
Christian, hath not yet, in its full latitude, a universal right to toleration; 
since there are some parts and instances of it which the magistrate hath 
absolutely forbidden, and that, for aught I could ever hear, without any 
offence to the tenderest consciences; for who doubts that to relieve with 
an alms the poor, though the beggars (if one sees them in want), is, if 
considered absolutely, a virtue and every particular man’s duty; yet this 
is amongst us prohibited by a law and the rigour of a penalty, and yet 
nobody in this case complains of the violation of his conscience or the 
loss of his liberty.
41
 
 
Here Locke begins with the suggestion that charity is ‘the great duty both of a man 
and a Christian’. This is, however, immediately tempered: acts of charity do not have 
‘a universal right to toleration’. His conclusion is that there is nothing wrong with 
existing legal barriers that act to prevent the giving of alms to a needy beggar. Locke 
is clear that giving assistance to a needy beggar is a moral duty and a virtuous act, but 
is equally clear that government can for whatever reason, legitimately outlaw such 
acts.  
  It is important to note that this particular passage does not actually reveal 
anything about Locke’s personal views on charity; whether he regards it as a perfect 
or imperfect moral obligation. Furthermore, this is early in his career, before he 
gravitated towards the radical Whig political views for which he is best known. And 
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this particular passage was actually omitted from the final draft of the essay of which 
it is part, which might make it seem especially insignificant. But none of these factors 
diminishes the importance of this passage: not as evidence of Locke’s view of the 
status of charitable obligations, but rather, as evidence of his recognition of a ‘right to 
do wrong’. The very fact that he is able to identify charity as a moral obligation and 
yet also identify acts of charity as a legitimate subjects of government prohibition 
clearly indicates that the state need not impose moral behaviour – it is possible, for 
Locke, for individuals to hold a legal ‘right’ to do what is morally wrong.  And, 
crucially, this would seem to undermine the claim that any imputation to Locke of a 
modern liberal conception of charity is necessarily anachronistic. Then, once the 
charge of anachronism is undermined, whether or not Locke’s theory of property 
includes a subsistence right comes down to textual analysis of section I: 42 of the Two 
Treatises. 
  There is further ambiguous evidence about the nature of charity available in 
‘Venditio’, Locke’s unpublished essay on just market prices. Here he initially draws a 
firm distinction between justice and charity with his claim that 
A man will not sell the same wheat this year under 10s per bushel which the last 
year he sold for 5s. This is no extortion…because it is this year the market 
price….If…he will sell his wheat only to the poor at this under rate, this indeed 
is charity but not what strict justice requires.
42
 
 
Justice is here defined as selling at market price; charity by contrast, amounts to 
selling below it. What is crucial is that for Locke, charity is something 
supererogatory, an action that the merchant can legitimately avoid; strict justice does 
not require doing the poor a favour. And he repeats this again: 
…what anyone has he may value at what rate he will and transgresses not 
against justice if he sells it at any price….I say he transgresses not against 
justice; what he may do against charity is another case.
43
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The point again seems quite to be quite clear: matters of justice and charity are 
fundamentally distinct and differ in the kinds of obligation they generate. Charity 
appears to be a very important virtue for Locke, but the fact that an individual can—in 
charging however much we want for our goods—transgress charity without at the 
same time transgressing strict justice, suggests that it is not a perfect obligation but an 
imperfect one. Selling our goods at market price might be ‘wrong’, because it causes 
discomfort for the poor, who struggle to afford them, but it seems to be a ‘wrong’ that 
we have a ‘right’ to in Locke’s eyes. 
But even here there are ambiguities and although ‘Venditio’ clearly 
demonstrates Locke’s belief that charity can be an imperfect moral obligation 
contrastable with perfect obligations of justice, the issue seems to shift when the 
preservation of human life is at stake. Indeed, towards the end of the essay, Locke 
declares that 
…he that sells his corn in a town pressed with famine at the utmost rate he can 
get for it does no injustice against the common rule of traffic, yet if he carry it 
away unless they will give him more than they are able, or extorts so much from 
their present necessity as not to leave them the means of subsistence afterwards, 
he offends against the common rule of charity as a man and if they perish any of 
them by reason of his extortion is no doubt guilty of murder.
44
 
 
 
Here, then, Locke suggests that the mere failure to act charitably is equivalent to 
murder. The question though is: is he guilty of murder as a Christian or as a citizen? Is 
the guilt part of a religious teleology, which would mean the individual would 
eventually answer to his or her Creator, or must the individual who transgresses 
charity instead answer to the magistrate? The law of nature would seem to indicate 
unequivocally that it is the latter and that the magistrate can intervene to punish the 
guilty party. But this is still not unambiguously so, as it remains unclear whether or 
not the corn-seller is under a positive duty to preserve lives or the negative alternative, 
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whereby the corn must not be sold in an extortive manner but need not be sold at a 
just price, because it need not be sold at all and certainly cannot be appropriated by 
the needy without the consent of the owner.  
 
IV  
This apparent ambiguity in Locke’s prescriptive political works demonstrates the need 
to understand his deployment of the term within the broader context of his religious 
writings. Taking Locke’s religious thought and its context seriously, reveals an 
alternative conceptualisation of charity that is at once broader than but also able to 
explain its apparently uncertain use in his account of political justice.  Instead of 
being merely applicable in relation to property transfers, obligatory or supererogatory, 
Locke’s understanding of charity is dispositional, obligatory as a disposition, and 
frequently expounded in terms of toleration.   
Turning to The Essay Concerning Human Understanding, important signs of 
Locke’s thought on charity are present.  In his discussion of charitable institutions 
such as hospitals and alms-houses,
45
 Locke appears to espouse a typical, liberal 
understanding of the term: voluntary property transfer in benefit of the afflicted.  Put 
another way, charity is understood as supererogatory outward performance.  But this 
does not put the issue to rest, for Locke is not referring to charity qua charity but to 
works of charity.  This is only an instantiation of the concept and not a general 
definition of the term. 
A crucial section elsewhere in the Essay, Book IV, Chapter 16, proves 
instructive.  Here Locke confronts the sectarian zeal of “parties,” which creates 
dangerous social divisions and ignores standards of rationality.
46
  The magnitude of 
17
th
 century religious intolerance shows this is no idle concern.  Neal Wood has 
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described Locke’s efforts in this part of the Essay at rescuing rationality from 
sectarian ignorance, further corroborating the significance of this topic.
47
   
Intriguingly, Locke proposes an apparent form of toleration as a remedy.  He 
writes: 
It would, methinks, become all Men to maintain Peace, and the 
common Offices of Humanity, and Friendship, in the diversity of 
Opinions, since we cannot reasonably expect, that anyone should 
readily and obsequiously quit his own Opinion, and embrace ours with 
a blind resignation to an Authority, which the Understanding of Man 
acknowledges not.
48
 
 
G. A. J. Rogers illuminates Locke’s underpinning of this kind of toleration through 
what he calls the ‘Argument from Ignorance’.
49
  The argument proceeds roughly as 
follows: if you cannot be absolutely certain of a proposition, you have no business in 
forcing others to accept what amounts to your opinion.  This line of argument is 
clearly present in Locke’s passage above.  Since it is ‘opinions’ that are in conflict 
here, which are distinct from ‘knowledge’ in the Lockean epistemological lexicon, 
then we cannot force our opinions on others.  Yet Locke’s argument does not seem to 
conclude there.   
In fact, typical discussions of Lockean toleration would seem to be unable to 
explain this section.  Focusing on the negative sense of Lockean toleration, as above, 
would seem to be futile in the face of sects who are keenly intolerant.  Instead Locke 
recommends what looks like positive affection in overcoming fanaticism and schism 
– positive toleration through peace, humanity, and friendship.  Such mutual affability, 
is not merely overlooking differing opinions, but a positive duty, much like that 
Anthony Wilhelm has drawn out in his recent study on positive duty in Lockean 
toleration.
50
  By titling this section decisively, “The right use of it is mutual Charity 
and Forbearance,” Locke implies that this benevolent disposition is integral to 
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charity.  Interestingly, Locke deploys the copular “is” in this passage.  This means 
Locke may not be just describing an act of charity but equating charity with this 
disposition of positive toleration. 
 If Locke does indeed intend for charity to be identified with a form of 
toleration, then one might anticipate corresponding evidence of this position in 
Locke’s explicit discussion of toleration. This is forthcoming in A letter Concerning 
Toleration
51
  when Locke deploys in succession both charity and toleration as 
equivalent tests of true Christianity.  Locke writes that toleration is, ‘the chief 
distinguishing mark of the true church.’
52
  And on charity:  
For however some people boast of the antiquity of places and names, 
or of the splendor of their ritual; others of the reformation of their 
teaching, and all of the orthodoxy of their faith (for everyone is 
orthodox to himself): these claims, and others of this kind, are more 
likely to be signs of men striving for power and empire than signs of 
the church of Christ.  If a man possesses all of these things, but lacks 
charity, meekness, and good will in general towards all mankind, even 
towards those who do not profess the Christian faith, he falls short of 
being a Christian himself.
53
 
 
The upshot is that charity and benevolence with humility, like toleration, are the 
decisive qualities of the true Christian.  Locke confirms the intermarriage of charity 
and toleration, but in so doing the role of this concept becomes more than an 
expedient against fanaticism.  Specifically, charity, including the love of others even 
when they are in error, is transformed into the definitive Christian virtue. 
This estimation of charity is not unique to the Letter on Toleration.  Locke’s 
central positioning of charity also appears in The Reasonableness of Christianity.  In 
the ‘Preface’, Locke observes that charity itself is the spirit of the entire Gospel.
54
  
Although a prefatory remark, the substance of Reasonableness seems to confirm this 
crucial, spiritual sense of charity.  Locke describes Christ’s judgement as one which 
distinguishes between the condemnable workers of iniquity and the redeemable who 
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‘fulfil the Law in acts of charity.’
55
  This depiction seems peculiar at first because it is 
lodged within Locke’s discussion of justification by faith.  If Christians are justified 
by faith, not works, why would Christ judge according to acts of charity?  Here 
Locke’s doctrine of repentance proves educative.  As it happens, true belief in Christ 
necessitates repentance, involving ‘hearty sorrow’ over, abhorrence of past and a 
forsaking of future sins.
56
  Hand in glove with this negative disposition towards 
sinning is a positive disposition toward moral behaviour.  Locke presumes that 
Christians, as true believers in Christ, will endeavour to enter His kingdom and, 
thusly, ‘working by love’ obey his ‘law and will.’
57
  It is, then, the moral law which 
Christ reconfirms and pitches negatively against vainglory, violence, and impropriety 
and positively for ‘Loving our Enemies; Doing good to those that hate us; Blessing 
those that Curse us; Praying for those that despighfully use us; Patience, and 
Meekness under Injuries; Forgiveness; Liberality; Compassion’, and ultimately the 
‘Golden Rule’ in Matthew VII. 12.
58
 The majority of these traits are or entail some 
emotional standpoint.  It seems strange to imagine patience, love, compassion, or 
forgiveness otherwise.  Thus within repentance Locke identifies a disposition of 
benevolence and tolerance that matches a spiritual dread of sin.  And, it is under this 
sense of repentance which the Christian is obligated to perform the moral law by 
which Christ judges works of charity.  Charity then, prior to the works resulting from 
it, evidently bears some equivalence to this benevolent Christian disposition.  For 
Locke, charity is, indeed, the spirit of the Gospel 
 Locke’s depiction of charity is not without influential precedent.  In fact, we 
can see that St. Paul utilises similar rhetoric in I Corinthians 13 in conveying an 
understanding of charity much like the one apparent in the Essay. Paul writes:  
Though I speak with the tongues of men and of angels, and have not 
charity, I am become as sounding brass, or a tinkling cymbal.  And 
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though I have the gift of prophecy, and understand all mysteries, and 
all knowledge; and though I have all faith so that I could remove 
mountains, and have not charity, I am nothing.
59
 
 
Lacking charity, Locke and Paul agree, that other goods and virtues are meaningless.  
Even in context, St. Paul is dealing with schism in Corinth much as Locke is invoking 
charity in his attempts to remedy similar problems of sect and intolerance.  
Substantively and stylistically, Locke’s thought on charity seems to mirror St. Paul. 
 More substantively, when Locke, late in life, comments on Paul’s I 
Corinthians, his terminology overlaps that of his Essay and the Letter. For example, 
Paul’s problem in Corinth is identified as “parties”,
60
 the same term used in the Essay.  
As in the Essay, Locke perceives Paul’s distinction between alms and charity,
61
 
thereby repudiating the identification of property transfer with charity.  Interestingly, 
Locke emphasizes the specifically dispositional sense of Pauline charity when he 
writes, “I will show you a more excellent way, viz. mutual good-will, affection and 
charity.”
62
 Locke uses good will, and affection to expound biblical charity, indicating 
a disposition, not an action.  This interpretation reproduces the language of 
benevolence adduced in the Essay and his estimation of charity in the Letter.  The 
point is not that Locke’s charity might depend on St. Paul’s (the time between the 
Essay and this commentary precludes that claim), but rather because his depiction of 
the Apostle’s term matches his own, this lends credence to a dispositional 
interpretation of Lockean charity. In sum, Locke, in both his philosophical and 
theological corpus, seems to consistently define charity as a disposition of positive 
toleration and affability, placing this at the centre of Christianity, coequal even with 
justification by faith. 
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V 
In both verifying the likelihood of Lockean charity as a disposition and puzzling out 
its ramifications in regard to political activity and justice, it proves helpful to explore 
the way thinkers Locke read or esteemed developed notions of charity.  Locke could 
have noticed the weight placed on charity in early Christian thought through his own 
study of scripture and, after 1680, patristic writings.
63
  This study would have 
occurred in time to influence Locke’s mature work, and possibly even the Two 
Treatises, but there is not clear evidence which would suggest that Locke’s study of 
such broad Christian sources would also have honed in on charity. 
More compelling are a number of philosophers, moralists, and theologians in 
Locke’s time with whom he had close interaction or positively recommended.  These 
thinkers tended to be either the Cambridge-Platonists, or moderate Anglican members 
of the so called “latitudinarians.”
64
   Without making slippery claims about the group 
identity of latitudinarians and Cambridge Platonists or Locke’s relation to these 
groups, all of the individuals examined below articulated conceptions of charity, love 
and the Christian spirit which show possible historical predication for Locke’s views. 
Before examining the substance of these thinkers’ thought on charity, it is 
important to examine the kind of associations Locke had with them.  The most 
obvious was Locke’s close personal friendship with the Cambridge-Platonist Ralph 
Cudworth’s daughter Damaris (Cudworth) Masham.  Damaris herself was active in 
promoting her father’s views and defended them in correspondence with Leibniz.
65
  
Although speculative, it is no stretch of the imagination to presume that she could 
have discussed her father’s work with Locke.  Locke both corresponded with 
Cudworth’s son Thomas and also seems to have known the Cudworth family before 
he left for Holland.
66
  All of this certainly shows the likelihood of Locke’s intellectual 
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familiarity with Cudworth’s positions.  As for Cudworth’s published works, Locke 
started reading the True Intellectual System of the Universe by 1682.
67
 
Locke’s letters reveal explicit familiarity with several Cambridge Platonists.  
Amongst the most important of these is Locke’s correspondence with Damaris 
Cudworth on the Select Discourses of John Smith.  The letters focus on Locke’s 
objections to Smith’s Neoplatonic epistemology and on Damaris’ attempts to 
convince Locke their positions are not so divergent as he imagines.
68
  In 1688, 
Damaris corresponded with Locke again concerning the epistemology of the 
Cambridge Platonists and the question of innate ideas.
69
  Nearing the end of his life, 
Locke’s letter to Richard King in August 1703, hails the sermons of Cambridge 
Platonist Benjamin Whichcote as a ‘masterpiece’ on the ‘larger View of the Parts of 
Morality.’
70
  Furthermore, Locke’s epistolary recommendation of Whichcote was 
predated by thirty-five years, for Locke had known Whichcote and was a member of 
his congregation in London from 1668.
71
 Locke’s association with several members 
of the Cambridge Platonists is clear. 
The thought of a number of moderate Anglican churchmen also appealed to 
Locke.  Several latitudinarians are exemplary.  Although the extent of Locke’s 
identification with these figures’ religious views is debated, there can be little doubt 
that Locke kept abreast of their work.
 72
  In Locke’s letters to Richard King, 
mentioned above, he recommends for the same purposes as Whichcote, 
Latitudinarians Isaac Barrow and John Tillotson.
73
  Interestingly, John Tillotson was a 
personal friend of Locke’s.
74
  The letter to Richard King itself shows remarkable 
similarity to ‘Some Thoughts Concerning Reading and Study for a Gentlemen’ also 
published in 1703.  In that text the liberal member of the Great Tew circle William 
Chillingworth is forcefully recommended for the right reasoning behind his speaking, 
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not to mention ‘anything of his argument.’
75
  Locke’s library tells a similar story.  By 
the time of his death, more than one hundred works by contemporary Latitudinarians 
and ‘many more’ by Cambridge Platonists, including More and Cudworth, were 
shelved in Locke’s collection.
76
  Suffice it to say that the evidence shows Locke’s 
sustained interest in this dimension of contemporaneous English thought. 
Unpacking the theology of these professors and divines shows there was 
precedent for Locke’s understanding of charity.  Most importantly, we want to draw 
attention to several key concepts integral to their understanding of charity which they 
develop, more or less consistently:  first, the centrality of charity as a disposition to 
Christianity and justification; second, that charity as a disposition is obligatory; 
finally, the social ramifications of charity and the important parallel with toleration 
that these thinkers develop.   
In their discussion of charity these Cambridge Platonists and liberal Anglicans 
consistently place it as a disposition at the centre of Christianity and the question of 
justification.  One of Smith’s major claims is that righteousness by faith is not about 
external performances in accordance with law, but concerns internal life, spiritual 
Godliness of the soul and the quickening spirit of the Gospel.
77
  Ultimately, “the 
righteousness of God” amounts to “a Christ-like Nature in a man’s Soul, or Christ 
appearing in the Minds of men by the mighty power of his Divine Spirit... .”
78
  
Righteousness by faith is not a type of knowledge, a promise, or an outward 
behaviour; rather, it is a disposition.  Cudworth agrees.  For him Christianity, while 
confluent with reason, cannot be coldly cognitive; it must contain a “quickening 
spirit” or vital life, for the New Law of the Gospel is itself vital.
79
  This vital spirit is a 
kind of laudatory passion or higher love, which Cudworth defines as charity, the “true 
intellectual instinct”, superior love, and the love of honesty.
80
  Conceptually Smith 
 23 
and Cudworth’s positions regarding charity and the essence of Christianity, match the 
claims Locke advanced about the dispositional nature of charity and its importance for 
Christianity. 
Precisely because this type of charity is central to these thinkers’ Christianity, 
it is qua disposition that charity is obligatory.  Whichcote elaborates the Christian 
disposition in terms of moral duties.  Whoever “professeth faith in the Gospel should 
live in universal Love and Good-will” – this is “absolutely’ necessary in Whichcote’s 
view.
81
  Whichcote holds that this attitude is called for by the New Testament more 
than anything else, remarking that “this cannot be said of very many Points of 
Divinity.”
82
  Crucially, this kind of duty cannot be satisfied by outward performances, 
such as almsgiving: 
For it is the choicest Piece of Charity; to make fair Interpretations, and 
to give Allowance; to make candid Constructions of Mens Actions; to 
afford civil and courteous Behavior; to be Conversant and Complacent.  
These Things tend to Love and Good-will among Men…
83
 
 
Charity, Christian Love, is played out in these civil behaviours and attitudes.  They 
represent duties both to think well of others and to interact with them beneficently.  At 
the same time, these duties evince the social importance of charity, for all of them are 
conducive to civic peace.  Crucially, and anticipating Locke’s understanding, these 
duties can only be met through a charitable disposition. 
A number of these thinkers clearly elucidate the role of this understanding of 
charity, like Locke, in terms of toleration.  Henry More, Whichcote, and 
Chillingworth repudiate religious intolerance, worrying that it masks a deeper 
problem of egotistical love.  For More, excessive, singular concern for religious 
doctrine destroys inward godliness because “Knowledge puffeth up…” unlike charity, 
which “edifieth.”
84
  Benjamin Whichcote makes a similar appeal.  He worries that 
zeal for religious truth is really just self-love in disguise, love of “our Fancy,” “our 
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Religion,” “our own Creatures,” and “our own Notions.”
85
  Chillingworth worries that 
the Catholic dogma of infallibility and the Church’s tendency to condemn and exclude 
those with different theological opinions has the actual affect of encouraging clerical 
authorities to substitute self-will for honest biblical interpretation.
86
 
On the other hand, true Christians are exemplars of tolerance.  Whichcote 
declares: 
This I dare undertake is really true of all that are sincere and hearty in 
their Profession of Religion.  And therefore to these there is due, 
Patience, and Charity.
87
 
 
Dogmatism is ultimately harmful to the piety of others.  For Whichcote, serious 
religious belief entails a tolerant attitude toward differing opinion.  This tolerance is 
resultant from Christian love and is synonymous with “Charity.”  Chillingworth 
stresses the importance of tolerant charity in Protestant Christianity.  He writes: 
And therefore there is no reason but we may believe that their full 
assurance of the former Doctrine doth very well qualifie their perswasion 
of the later; and that the former … are more effectual to temper their hope, 
and to keep it a stay of a filial and modest assurance of Gods favour, built 
upon the conscience of his love and fear, than later can be to swell and pff 
them up into vain confidence and ungrounded presumption.  This reason 
joyn’d with our experience of the honest and religious conversation of 
many men of this opinion, is a sufficient ground for Charity, to hope well 
of their Hope: and to assure our selves that it cannot be offensive, but 
rather most acceptable to God, if, notwithstanding this diversity of 
opinion, we embrace each other with the strict embraces of love and 
communion.  To you and your Church we leave it, to separate Christians 
from the Church, and to proscribe them from heaven upon trivial and 
trifling causes.
88
 
 
By classifying faith with moral probability, Christians with differing views can still be 
held within the Christian community, not by unity of doctrine, but by the embrace of 
tolerant charity.  In sum, these thinkers’ all insist that the disposition of charity, while 
an end in itself, is instrumental in maintaining religious peace and inclusively.  The 
alternative is religious strife, and the history of seventeenth century conflict shows 
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that any boundaries between religious animosity and social discord are fragile and 
porous.    
Ultimately, Locke read or recommended Cambridge-Platonists and the 
tolerant Anglican divines with clear enthusiasm.  Add to that the evident similarities 
between their thought on charity, and it seems entirely plausible that Locke’s 
conceptualisation was developed in this vein.  While certainly of central theological 
and, consequently, social importance, because this conception of dispositional charity 
is so closely affiliated with toleration, alternative ways of interpreting the intersection 
of charity with matters of Lockean political justice can be elucidated.   
 
VI 
Keeping in mind the conceptual closeness of Locke’s thought on charity with that of 
the latitudinarian and Cambridge-Platonist authors examined above, it is evident that 
he conceives of charity as a disposition equivalent to toleration and fundamental to 
Christianity.  Although requisite under natural law broadly conceived, it is because 
Locke’s charity is a disposition that it is prior to outward human behaviour and, 
consequently, necessarily absent from that part of natural law included in Lockean 
political justice.  This accounts for Locke’s vacillations when discussing charity 
within the framework of magisterial enforcement, explaining why the obligation of 
charity to positively benefit mankind, is only enforced negatively when failure to be 
charitable produces injurious results. 
   In order to substantiate this claim, some further analysis of the charity in 
relation to justice and law in Locke’s religious and philosophical thought is required, 
which both allays anxieties about and specifies the grounding of dispositional charity 
in Lockean politics.  In a crucial passage from Of the Conduct of the Understanding, 
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Locke remarks that the study and practice of theology are the most important, 
universal duties.  He asserts: 
There is indeed, one Science (as they are now distinguished) 
incomparably above all the rest where it is not corruption narrowed 
into a trade or faction for meane or ill ends and secular interests, I 
meane Theolgie, which conteining the knowledge of God and his 
creatures, our duty to him and our fellow creatures and a view of our 
present state is the comprehension of all other knowledge directed to 
its true end i.e. the honour and veneration of the Creator and the 
happynesse of man kinde.  This is that noble study which is every 
man's duty and one that everyone that can be called a rational creature 
is capable of.
89
 
 
For Locke, human beings have a normative duty to understand and presumably 
practice theology.  Because he believes charity is the central theological obligation, 
this passage would seem to indicate that it is not only for aspirant Christians but for 
all ‘rational creatures’, all of humanity. 
 Following Locke’s thought on theological duties, it is important to emphasise 
his belief that just politics always upholds the standards of natural law.
90
  Locke’s 
remarks on the composition of natural law are sparse, but we do know he regularly 
equated it with God’s divine law.  Just as in the Gospel where Christ promulgates the 
duty of charity or neighbourly love to all Christians as the summa and transcendence 
of Mosaic Law,
91
 Locke applies charity enthusiastically to his conception of divine 
law.  Locke recalls the Gospel of John Chapters 13 – 15, where Christ commands the 
disciples to love each other as he had loved them.  For Locke, this new commandment 
confirms and purifies the divine moral law, toward which the disciples are obligated.
92
  
Because the duty entailed in Locke’s other theological writings adduced here is much 
the same, if there is anything he thinks natural or divine law require it is charity. 
If we accept that charity is the essence of the Gospel, Gospel doctrine is the 
fullness of God’s divine law, divine law equals natural law, and that natural law is 
preserved in government (all of which Locke maintains), then the theological concept 
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of charity would seem to be transferred into the sphere of Locke’s political thought.  
But the further claim that charity would be necessity under Lockean political regimes, 
and anyone who denies it could be punished runs against many of Locke’s utterances 
identified earlier, where acts of charity are morally important but not juridical 
requirements.  There is some perplexity here about the specific relationship between 
political justice and charity that requires further elaboration.  
Taking the dispositional quality of Lockean charity seriously shows the 
difficulties concerning legally mandatory performances of charitable acts.  The point 
of contradiction emerges when considering what magistrates might legally enforce in 
regard to charity.  Because Locke’s charity is higher love, one wonders how such a 
disposition could be the subject of legal action at all.  Certainly a government might 
command, de jure, that all citizens must bear a charitable disposition in strict 
accordance with natural law, but it does not require much imagination to see the 
hollowness of such legislation.  Governments can control outward behaviour, they can 
even impute reasons for actions, but they cannot identify, prevent, or instil 
dispositions short of a complex educational apparatus absent from Locke’s political 
thought.  At best a government might settle for mandating charitable acts. 
However, enforcing charitable acts creates a second problem by decisively 
driving citizens away from charitable dispositions.  Expanding on the parallels 
between charity and Locke’s thought on religious toleration helps clarify this.  One 
can force compliance with external acts of worship, but actual doctrinal beliefs are a 
personal matter not subject to such compulsion.  Worse, coercion of charity or acts 
thereof runs counter to the very non-coercive charity that Locke recommends when 
dealing with differences of opinion in the Essay.  Just as with disagreeing parties 
attempting to impose orthodoxies on each other, if the magistrate hopes to convince 
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someone to be charitable, then forcing them to perform what they should do 
voluntarily might produce the unintended consequences of contention and spite.  
Because Locke believes charity is an important universal duty with important civic 
ramifications, such unnecessary threats to charity should presumably be avoided.  
Upon this view, Locke’s reluctance to make charity part of political justice shows his 
recognition that legal compulsion cannot command the dispositions and might militate 
against charity actually flourishing.  
Ultimately, the social importance of the disposition of charity requires that 
acts of charity usually lie outside the remit of Lockean government.  A Thomistic 
interpretation of Lockean charity cannot fit the bill.  Nevertheless, all individuals still 
hold the natural duty to be charitable.  So even though this duty is not governmentally 
actionable, its obligatory status means that the use of charity in Locke’s social thought 
cannot be explained away as mere supererogation.  Furthermore, there may be certain 
cases where Lockean political justice and charity overlap.  The identification of such 
cases relies upon the distinction between positive and negative obligations under 
natural law.  If requiring positive acts of charity is normally illegitimate, it is not true 
that governments lack authority over anti-charitable behaviour.  Hence, people who 
are acting in clearly uncharitable ways should be restrained.  Although it is not clear 
exactly where the threshold lies between legally permissible exercise of a right to do 
wrong and actual harm lies, when it is crossed the uncharitable act, as an infraction 
against negative obligations, becomes criminal.  Consequently, Locke appears to 
permit coercion against such uncharitable behaviour. 
Obviously such coercion would apply to such uncharitable acts as highway 
robbery or murder, but the prohibition of these behaviours is always required under 
natural law and political justice.  The interpretive power of this threshold test is that it 
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helps explain juridical action in certain specific cases where a violation of the positive 
duty to be charitable is at issue.  The example from ‘Venditio’ fits this scenario 
because, unlike typical criminals, the high prices charged by the corn seller do not 
necessarily involve an attempt to harm others, only a refusal of positive obligation.  
Yet we saw above that Locke identifies the case in ‘Venditio’ as murder.  This is 
because the failure to help is not distinct from the causing of harm.  Here the violation 
of the positive and negative obligation is one and the same.  In such cases, the normal 
distinction between negative and positive obligations dissolves.  In these 
circumstances Charity is perfectly obligatory as part of political justice and prior to 
other rights save, preservation of self.  
Thus, the political role of charity is predicated by Locke’s care in 
distinguishing between charity as a disposition and the grounds of political obligation 
and prohibition.  Nevertheless, Locke takes charity, in this full sense, to be not only 
central for Christian ethics but also a universal imperative.  This view is not narrowly 
political but suggestive of the systematic tendencies of his broader thought.  Without 
bringing together these various theoretical concerns, Locke would not have seen that 
political control contravenes the disposition of charity.  Justice and charity cannot 
collapse into each other without endangering the purposes of both.  It is for this reason 
that charity as a disposition of tolerance and beneficence can only ever be a matter of 
political justice, and therefore only ever trump property rights, in certain tightly 
defined circumstances.  Thus, Locke’s work on charity shows both continuance and 
the negotiation amongst the philosophical, theological, social and political aspects of 
his thought.  It is often the exceptions to the rule that are most revealing.  
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